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This paper aims at presenting an assessment of welfare reforms under a framework of 
program heterogeneity and alternative measures of success. We focus on a specific welfare 
program –Madrid’s Ingreso Madrileño de Integración (IMI)– which comprises 
heterogeneous subprograms. We test whether work-related subprograms perform better 
than general activities aimed at improving life skills. We also try to identify which work-
related subprogram works best. The availability of a large database of administrative 
records (over 50,000 spells) matched with a special survey conducted for former welfare 
recipients makes possible to develop different types of evaluation strategies on the basis of 
multiple participation states. Our results show that intensive employment activities yield 
remarkably better results than general work-related schemes or life skills activities. 
However, increasing work participation does not automatically lift participants out of 
material hardship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last years, there has been a lively debate on the success of welfare reforms in 
terms of achieving better results in labor market participation and economic well-being. 
Most OECD countries have enacted major welfare reform legislation  with the  aim  of 
increasing work incentives and reducing costs. As a consequence, there is a wide array of 
options for recipients to participate in work-related activities.  The heavy emphasis on 
engaging recipients in work activities has rekindled interest in exploring whether these 
reforms have resulted in higher levels of well-being for participants. There has been much 
discussion over U.S. policy changes with considerable empirical evidence on the relevant 
outcomes.
1 Differential effects are found when considering the results of both work-first 
strategies –trying to push recipients into the labor market as rapidly as possible– and long-
term programs –focused on human capital developments providing intensive training and 




Work-related reforms of welfare policies have also given rise to a considerable European 
literature. A  huge range of experiences  has  already  been  assessed  including extensive 
activation programs in the field of Social Security and labor market policies in Nordic 
countries  [Sianesi (2004, 2008), and Carling and Richardson (2004)], specific targeted 
welfare-to-work initiatives in the Netherlands [Van Oorschot (2002), and Van den Berg et 
al. (2004)], new policies focusing on low-income families with children combining Social 
Assistance reforms with earned income tax credits in the United Kingdom [Blundell and 
Meghir (2002), Lydon and Walker (2005), Gregg et al. (2009)], welfare-to-work programs 
and job search enforcement in Germany (Huber et al., 2009) or  ‘insertion  contracts’ 
embedded in minimum income programs in France and Spain [Zoyem (2001), Ayala and 
Rodríguez (2006a), and Terracol (2009)]. In general terms, there is voluminous evidence 
showing that policy changes appeared to have mattered.  
  
Even  though  substantial  research  has  been carried out,  caution is important when 
evaluating these policies. Firstly, we have relatively little insight into the different effects the 
activities grouped under the notion of work-related welfare schemes have brought about. 
                                                 
1 For a synthetic overview, see Moffitt and Ver Ploeg (2001), Blank (2002), and Grogger and Karoly (2005). 
2 See Cancian et al. (1999), Freedman et al. (2000), Moffitt (2001), Barnow and Gubits (2002), Bloom et al. 
(2004), and Dyke et al. (2006).   3 
This is due to the heterogeneous nature of such activities.  In many countries, these 
programs are not mutually exclusive  and welfare recipients can participate  in different 
activities. This fact raises complex methodological issues the standard evaluation literature 
does not deal with. The standard binary treatment model of only two states could be 
extended to multiple states, but it needs to be suitably revised [Imbens (1999), Lechner 
(2001, 2002), Sianesi (2008), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)]. 
  
Secondly, there is growing evidence that suggests that the effects of these programs may 
differ between outcomes. It can be difficult to see the whole picture of the programs’ 
results if evaluation focuses exclusively on employment. While most of the new programs 
have been designed to move welfare recipients into the labor market, the ultimate goal of 
these policies is to improve the economic self-sufficiency of these households. In practice, 
the assessment of welfare reforms depends crucially on the indicators chosen to measure 
the programs’ outcomes.  As reviewed by Cancian and Meyer (2004), little systematic 
analysis deals with the question of whether different measures of success are capturing the 
same thing. The programs’ success can vary greatly depending on whether independence 
from Public Assistance or  income poverty are used as  outcome indicators  instead of 
employment results [Blank (2002), Grogger and Karoly (2005)]. Studies in welfare program 
evaluation have also paid special attention to the effects on material hardship. While some 
authors have found that low-wage working mothers experienced higher levels of hardship 
than welfare recipients [Edin and Lein (1997), Danziger et al. (2002)], others concluded that 
material circumstances of single mother families improved modestly after welfare reform in 
the U.S. [Winship and Jencks (2004), Meyer and Sullivan (2006)]. 
 
Consequently, one of the outstanding challenges in the evaluation of welfare programs is to 
analyze the effects of different and simultaneous  treatments in work-related welfare 
reforms  –program heterogeneity–  on  different types of outcomes. This  paper aims at 
presenting an assessment of welfare reforms under a framework of program heterogeneity 
and alternative measures of success. We focus on a specific welfare program –Madrid’s 
Ingreso Madrileño de Integración (IMI)–  which comprises  heterogeneous subprograms. In 
Southern Europe, active labor market policies usually embedded in new designs of welfare 
programs coexist with a variety of initiatives aimed at promoting life skills. Therefore, 
recipients can simultaneously participate in very different actions and can be considered as 
treated, as they should take part in some specific activity.   4 
 
Many reasons  make this program  particularly valuable  for  a  comparative evaluation of 
welfare reforms. Firstly, to the extent that benefit levels fall between the low payments in 
the  U.S. and the generous ones that are made in Northern Europe,  this analysis can 
provide an interesting comparison for other countries. Secondly, the IMI approach to self-
sufficiency seems less punitive than the U.S. approach based on strict conditions, sanctions, 
and time limits. Thirdly, while the context and program details are different than those in 
the U.S. or the Nordic countries there are remarkable similarities with the experience of 
other Southern European Countries. Our results could also apply to some extent to other 
countries with similar conditions. 
 
In order to measure the relative effectiveness of the different activities available for IMI 
recipients,  we address two different questions: first, we test whether  work-related 
subprograms perform better than general activities aimed at improving life skills; second, 
we try to identify which work-related subprogram works best. We perform propensity 
score matching in a setting of heterogeneous treatments. Our results show that intensive 
employment  activities  –such  as  subsidized employment or engagement in social 
enterprises– yield remarkably better results than general work-related schemes or life skills 
activities in terms of employment and subjective well-being. However, increasing work 
participation does not automatically lift participants out of material hardship. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The opening section summarizes the particular 
design features of the IMI program and the available data. The second section reviews 
different approaches to deal with the problem of evaluation in a framework of multiple 
states and alternative outcomes. The third section tests the extent to which the results are 
sensitive to alternative definitions of success by  comparing the performance of the 
different treatments. Concluding remarks are presented in the final section. 
 
1. THE IMI PROGRAM 
 
1.1. Institutional features of the program 
 
The program analyzed in this study is the Madrid Regional Government’s Welfare Program 
(IMI), which was set up in 1990. The Spanish system of means-tested benefits has   5 
drastically changed over the last decades. A characteristic trait of the system has been the 
gradual coverage of different demographic groups by means of specific welfare sub-
systems. This expansion gave rise to a certain softening of social conflict, but created 
additional social segmentation by adding differentiation in the type of income guarantee to 
differences already existing in earnings and income mobility. The final result is a close-
woven welfare network. Despite attempts at rationalization a complex mixture of 
overlapping benefits survives and significant gaps in the system’s overall coverage persist. 
Unemployed individuals who have previously worked have access to two types of benefits: 
the contributory benefit and the assistance subsidy.  In order to gain access to the first 
level, workers must have previously paid social contributions to cover this risk. The 
unemployment subsidy is for people whose contributory benefit has expired and who have 
income of less than 75 percent of the National Minimum Wage. 
 
Welfare schemes are designed for those individuals who have exhausted their rights to 
unemployment benefits and who are not working. General risk of poverty is covered by 
regional schemes and Social Assistance in Spain is completely decentralized. The Madrid 
Program can be considered an ‘average’ program within the complex set of regional 
schemes existing in Spain and Southern Europe. As in other European schemes,  all 
households are entitled to IMI access if they have used up entitlement to other income 
maintenance programs.  
 
Previous studies have pointed out that employability and belonging to an ethnic minority 
are the main determining factors leading to lengthened spells in the program, with visible 
signs of a certain degree of duration dependence (Ayala and Rodríguez, 2006b). These 
results show that there are different kinds of recipients depending on their ability to enter 
the labor market. Consequently, they need to be dealt with differently. Previous research 
has also provided information on the IMI’s recidivism determinants (Ayala and Rodríguez, 
2010). These studies have found that activities to maximize the duration of the off-welfare 
spells should focus on implementing reforms that improve recipients’ chances of leaving 
the program to enter into more stable forms of employment and allocate a greater amount 
of resources to promote the ‘insertion’ of specific groups.
3
                                                 
3 Insertion is the general term used in these countries to summarize the different types of activities aimed at 
improving life and labor skills of welfare participants. In general terms, it means higher levels of social 
participation. 
 There is also evidence from   6 
standard binary treatment evaluation that participation in work-related activities reduces 
recidivism rates among IMI recipients (Ayala and Rodríguez, 2006a). 
 
Among the different institutional features of the program, the ‘insertion activities’ represent 
the most prominent trait in a comparative framework. Once benefits are approved by the 
program’s managers, recipients must sign an ‘insertion contract’ with the welfare agencies. 
Participation in these contracts is mandatory while recipients receive benefits. Initially, they 
are intended to improve the recipients’ self-sufficiency through an individualized design of 
‘insertion’ activities adjusted both to individual and households’ characteristics. The idea of 
co-responsibility is at the heart of the program. Individual assessment is conducted when 
recipients enter the program and social services support is provided to help these 
households to address specific challenges. The contents of the contracts are negotiated by 
both sides resulting in a final plan of specific public intervention for each household.  
 
Therefore, the program’s outcomes could be conditioned by the efficacy of caseworkers in 
allocating individuals to government programs. Recent studies have stressed the key role of 
caseworkers in the assignment of welfare recipients to different work-related programs 
[Bloom et al. (2003), Behncke et al. (2009), Lechner and Smith (2007), Huber at al. (2009)]. 
Most of the evidence shows that caseworkers matter in allocation decisions. Available data 
from our survey somewhat confirm that caseworkers also play a relevant role in assigning 
IMI recipients to the different treatments. Nevertheless, most respondents state that, while 




Every recipient, therefore, has to join a specific program, bringing about a very different 
scenario than that depicted by the standard theory of program evaluation. A very relevant 
issue is that recipients can  simultaneously participate in different activities. A  broad 
classification of the activities can be made by breaking down the existing activities into two 
categories. The first set of activities includes overall actions developed to guarantee the 
basic preconditions of social participation. They consist of a variety of services comprising 
such different topics as general life skills, family  mediation, children’s schooling and 
                                                 
4 Households were asked on the assignment process. Results do not show big differences in the observed 
frequencies between the different treatments. Almost one third of the assignments were the result of an 
agreement under caseworkers’ predominance and approximately 30 percent were made on the basis of a fifty-
fifty agreement between caseworkers and recipients.   7 
activities aimed at making it easier for some families to continue their daily routines or 
helping recipients recognize their strengths.  
 
A second set  of  activities  specifically aim at improving  recipients’ employment 
opportunities (labour skills). There is also certain heterogeneity among these sub-programs. 
There are, first, various general services designed to improve the recipients’ labor market 
opportunities; second, there are specific actions trying to push recipients into the labor 
market as soon as possible, including social enterprises and subsidized employment. The 
common purpose of these actions is the achievement of basic labor skills and the 
establishment of a friendly work environment as necessary first steps in the transition to 
competitive employment. Social enterprises are relatively similar to some of the experiences 
embedded in the U.S. paid work experience programs. Usually, they are conducted by 
government agencies and non-profit organizations. These entities work with a variety of 
targeted populations, including long-term unemployed.  
 
  1.2. Data 
 
In this study, we match the program’s administrative records –covering the whole history 
of the program–  with  a specific survey  conducted in 2001. This survey covers very 
different dimensions of the households’ economic well-being some years after their 
participation in the program. The merging of the two sources may prove successful in 
creating a comprehensive dataset for evaluation purposes. On the one hand, by examining 
administrative records, we have very detailed information on the recipients’ characteristics 
at the moment of entering the program. On the other hand, the IMI survey allows us to 
assess these households’ economic well-being some time after participating in the different 
treatments. Furthermore, by matching administrative records with outcome variables, such 
as employment, income, and living conditions, we can correct some potential biases in 
evaluation related to omitted information on the characteristics of previous welfare 
participation.  
 
The examination of the program’s administrative records allows us to study a very diverse 
set of socioeconomic characteristics of IMI  recipients. We have information on over 
50,000 spells in the program corresponding to 39,200 households. 8,500 of them had left 
the program at some stage and then re-entered it at least once. Recipients’ characteristics   8 
include some of the variables highlighted as ideal for analyzing welfare populations, such as 
the existence of structural problems (social isolation, alcohol abuse and drug addiction) or 
the development of behavior associated with marginal situations (prostitution or begging).  
 
The survey of IMI recipients was conducted by the Madrid Government in 2001 including 
very detailed information on both participation in subprograms during their time in IMI 
and different dimensions of the current economic situation. The sample size of the survey 
is about 2,300 households, obtained by stratified random sampling from the program’s 
administrative records. The population of ex-welfare recipients was divided into four strata 
and a simple random sample was selected from each stratum.
5
 
 The variables used to define 
the strata were: date of entry, exit type, duration of IMI participation and town size.  
The  survey  contains  detailed information on participation in the different ‘insertion’ 
activities included in the IMI program. The different subprograms considered in the survey 
are general information, general counseling, continuous individual support, psychological 
support, legal support, children intervention, family mediation, group activities, assistance 
to  obtain  other benefits, access to specific employment offers, general job search 
assistance, training, subsidized employment and social enterprises. There is also 
information on different dimensions of economic well-being, such as  employment, 
subjective economic well-being, material hardship and social difficulties. We will use these 
dimensions to evaluate the outcomes of the program.
6
 
  Some data on socioeconomic 
characteristics such as age, gender, household type, marital status, educational attainment 
and labor status are also collected in the dataset.  
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this evaluation is to identify which alternative packages  of ‘insertion’ 
activities bring about substantial improvements in the participants’ economic well-being.  
The IMI survey provides very detailed information on fourteen different treatments, 
mixing activities aimed at upgrading life skills and work-related initiatives. For the purpose 
                                                 
5 The survey was conducted using as initial universe those households that had been in the program at a given 
moment in the previous decade. Therefore the sample may include both households who are still in the 
programs and welfare leavers. 
6  We will use the survey data to identify treatments and outcomes. Socioeconomic information from 
administrative records of these households will be used to estimate the probability of taking part in a given 
treatment. Therefore, the sample we use in our identification strategy is 2,300 households.   9 
of this study, the different treatments were aggregated into four different and mutually 
exclusive groups: non-participation in specific work-related subprograms (life-skills only) 
(n=811), participation in general labor-oriented activities (n=594), participation in labor-
intensive activities (n=113) and participation both in general labor-oriented activities and in 
labor-intensive activities (n=331). The first group (treatment) comprises overall actions 
developed  only  to guarantee the basic preconditions of social participation (general 
information, general counseling, continuous individual support, psychological support, 
legal support, children intervention, family mediation, assistance related to other  social 
benefits, and group activities).
7
 
  The second group (treatment)  includes general labor 
services for recipients (access to employment offers,  general job search assistance  and 
training). The third group (treatment) involves more intensive actions to foster transitions 
from welfare to work (subsidized employment and social enterprises). The fourth group 
(treatment) refers to individuals taking part simultaneously in the second and third groups. 
To the extent that every recipient participates in one of the four defined groups, we focus 
on the relative effectiveness of each treatment. Among the relevant options for policy-
makers,  three  specific questions can  be addressed. First, we  evaluate the effects  of 
participation in some work-related scheme as compared to participation in general activities 
promoting life skills. Second, we assess the effects of participation in each one of the 
specific work-related schemes –general, intensive and mixed– as compared to participation 
in general life skills activities. Third, we also examine the relative effectiveness of each 





A key question in the analysis of the different effects is the selection problem arising when 
treatment assignment is not random. Observable traits differ for the treatment groups (see 
Table  1 in the annex). Therefore, it would be misleading to just compare individuals 
between treatment groups. A well-known problem of causal inference is how to estimate 
treatment effects in observational studies in situations where some individuals are exposed 
to a treatment, but with no methods of experimental design to get a control group. In this 
paper we use propensity score matching estimators to build up a sample counterpart by 
                                                 
7 Individuals in groups 2, 3 and 4 can simultaneously participate in any of the life-skills activities included in 
the first group.   10 
pairing each participant with non-participant recipients with similar characteristics. As it is 
widely known, a necessary assumption is conditional independence between non-treated 
outcomes and program participation (Rubin, 1977).  
 
The main limitations of matching are this assumption and that it relies on a sufficiently rich 
comparison group. As the number of observable covariates increases, it becomes more 
difficult to find exact matches for each of the treated units. In a seminal study, Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) suggested the use of the probability of receiving treatment conditional on 
covariates (propensity score) to reduce the dimensionality of the matching problem. As 
stressed by Becker and Ichino (2002), if this balancing hypothesis is satisfied, observations 
with the same propensity score must have the same distribution of observable 
characteristics independently of treatment status.  
 
Most of the evaluation literature of welfare reforms using matching estimators rests, 
however, on a basic framework in which a program is administered at a fixed point in time, 
and individuals are either treated or nor treated. For an adequate evaluation of the IMI 
program, it is necessary to extend the standard binary treatment model of only two states to 
the case of multiple states [Imbens (1999), Lechner (2001, 2002), Sianesi (2008), Imbens 
and Wooldridge (2009)]. Given a framework of (M+1) mutually exclusive subprograms 
(treatments), every individual  will have one observable outcome {Y0,  Y1,…,YM}. 
Participation in one of the predefined mutually exclusive subprograms is indicated by S ∈ 
{0,1,…,  M}.  We are interested in the effects of participation in one subprogram (a) 








 |S=a) = E(Y
a|S=a) – E(Y
b|S=a)     (1) 
 
where τ
a,b represents the expected effect for a welfare recipient randomly drawn from the 
group participating in subprogram a. As in the case of the standard binary treatment, we 
need a counterfactual to estimate E(Y
b|S=a).  
 
Under  the assumption  that  conditional independence holds also  in the multiple-states 
framework,  evaluation requires observing  all the characteristics (X)  of the program’s 
recipients affecting both the probability of participation in the respective subprograms and   11 
the outcome variables. All participants in subprogram a need to have a counterpart in 
group b for each X (Imbens, 1999).
  8
 
 We can select from the participants in b a control 
group whose distribution of observed variables is as similar as possible to the distribution 
in the group of participants in subprogram a. This requires: 
0 < Pr (S=a| X=x) < 1    for x ∈  X
~       (2) 
  
and guarantees that all treated recipients have a counterpart in the other group. 
 
For an adequate comparison of the outcomes of the different subprograms, we need a 
balancing score function (g(X)) of the recipients’ characteristics. Since we are interested in 
the pair-wise comparisons of the different subprograms, we need to find a balancing score 
ensuring the balancing of the X’s in the two subpopulations of interest for each 
comparison: 
 
E[Pr(S=a|X, S∈{a,b})|g(X)] = Pr(S=a|X, S∈{a,b}) ≡ P
a/ab     (3) 
 
Equation (1) can then be calculated, once the counterfactual is estimated as:  
 
E(Y
b|S=a)=  ab a P E / [E(Y
b|S=b, P
a/ab(X))|S=a]       (4) 
 
As discussed by Lechner (2002), two different approaches can be used to estimate the 
respective propensity scores for matching. One approach consists of specifying and 
estimating a multiple discrete-choice model, such as multinomial logit or probit model 
(structural approach). A second approach entails estimating all conditional probabilities 
between possible pairs of choices directly (reduced-form approach). This second approach 
closely mirrors the usual propensity score approach for binary treatments. The reduced-
form approach is not prohibitive when used with a relatively low number of comparisons 
(seven in our case). We also avoid the problem of the structural approach when one choice 
equation is misspecified biasing all conditional probabilities.  
 
                                                 
8  As we are only interested in the pair-wise  comparisons of the programs defined, the assumption of 
conditional independence can be relaxed by requiring to hold only for the groups of individuals receiving 
either treatment a or treatment b.   12 
A relevant question is the selection of X’s for balancing the different subsamples in each 
pair-wise comparison. The resulting quality of the matched samples has informed  our 
choice. We have used the administrative records to select the characteristics necessary to 
estimate the propensity score.  The covariates considered where the number of social 
problems, single-parenthood, educational level, unemployment rate at entry, household 
size, number of children, single persons, gender –they all were measured at the moment of 
entering the program– and some variables related to the administrative process including 
the duration of the treatment.  
 
To compare subprogram a and subprogram b, each participant in the former group is 
matched to one participant in group b based on the balancing score. Different procedures 
were selected for associating the sets of participants. The results we present below have 
been obtained with nearest neighbor matching estimators without replacement. As stressed 
by Smith and Todd (2005), replacement reduces bias but in turn increases the variance of 
the estimator. The problem of matching without replacement is that estimates depend on 
the order  in which observations get matched  (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  In our 
estimates ordering is randomly done. We carried out different sensitivity analyses with 




Estimates of the effects of ‘insertion’ activities on the recipients’ economic well-being by 
using propensity score estimators are only reliable if the matching produces credible 
control groups. There is a common support requirement for all pair-wise comparisons. 
Figure 1 plots the different density distributions of the propensity score for  each 
comparison. Overlap in compared propensity scores regions seems to ensure common 
support across treatment groups. Even though there are slight differences between the 
seven comparisons –the matching is especially high in evaluations 1,4, and 6– the fit is 






                                                 
9 Results are available upon request. 
10 Other indicators of matching quality were also estimated. The reduction in the standardised bias suggested 
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) was estimated for the different variables used to define treated and matched 
control subsamples. Only gender and single-parenthood in evaluation 3 and unemployment, household size 
and number of children in evaluation 4 showed differences that were not significant.   13 
A second general question is the definition of outcomes. As stated above, results can be 
highly sensitive to the dimensions chosen for the assessment of economic well-being. 
Although most of the ‘insertion’ activities aim to foster transitions from welfare to work, 
employment activities do not always account for changes in the opportunities for self-
sufficiency. Subjective well-being,  poverty or material hardship could be as relevant as 
earnings or working hours’ indicators.  
 
We have chosen three different dimensions to evaluate the relative effectiveness of the 
different subprograms under study. In spite of the fact that there are some limitations for a 
complete assessment of the outcomes in each dimension, the survey allows us to draw a 
very comprehensive picture of results.  The first dimension focuses on employment 
outcomes and two  indicators are used: 1)  whether  the household head is currently 
employed and 2) whether there is a legal contract and payment of employer contributions. 
The IMI survey does not provide information on households’ incomes. The  survey, 
however, comprises a set of questions allowing the measurement of subjective well-being. 
We have defined two dummy indicators for this dimension: subjective poverty and changes 
in living standards as compared to ten years ago (self-assessed).  
 
A third dimension comprises different indicators of material hardship. Most of them are 
related to housing conditions.
11
 
 Given the different nature of the available indicators, it 
seems clear that all the items considered carry a different weight in the households’ 
economic well-being.  Arithmetic addition implicitly imposes a severe value judgment 
because it does not differentiate the weighting of each material condition or necessity. 
Different indicators have been applied to derive a synthetic measure of multiple 
deprivations in the literature on multidimensional poverty. The different conditions can be 
summarized into an index of material hardship:  
Zi = Σj wj z(dij)          (5) 
 
or an index of living standards: 
 
Li = Σj wj l(dij)          (6) 
                                                 
11 The conditions included in the index of material hardship are running water, hot running water, having 
electricity, having gas, inside toilet with running water, bath or shower, wash basin, kitchen, oven, refrigerator, 
washing machine, dishwasher, heating, telephone, mobile phone, car, and van.     14 
 
where z(⋅) and l(⋅) are non-increasing and non-decreasing functions, respectively, of the 
amount dij possessed by the ith household (i=1,...,n) of the jth attribute (j=1,...,J), and wj is 
the corresponding weight. While some authors give an equal weight to each item, the 
interpretation of deprivation as a relative situation is at the core of this line of research. 
One of the most common strategies is to apply weighting systems which give more 
importance to the goods most widely owned in a society. For the material hardship index 










where vj is the number of households not lacking item j in the survey. Thus, the weights 
attached to each item are functions of the spread of the good among the whole population, 
compared to the spread of the other goods or activities considered. The commodities most 
people in society enjoy are given more weight. We also define an index of material well-
being using the complementary options. A  final  measure provides information on the 






In order to measure the relative effectiveness of the different subprograms we estimate 
average effects for each pair-wise comparison and for the three types of indicators we have 
defined. We address two different questions in each case: first, we test if work-related 
subprograms perform better than general activities aimed at improving life skills; then, we 
try to identify which work-related subprogram works best. In each case, we estimate an 
unconditional estimator which is 100 times the treatment B group mean minus the 
treatment A group mean divided by the treatment A group mean. 
 
One of the main thrusts of the IMI’s development has been the provision of skills to 
welfare recipients so that they are closer to the labor market. Considering the achievement 
of higher employment rates as a central goal, we might expect a better performance of 
                                                 
12 Housing difficulties include inadequate housing conditions, overcrowding, excessive spending, and non-
payment of dwelling.   15 
work-related activities as compared to life-skills activities. The main result of Table 2 is that 
employment effects are substantially higher for those subprograms aimed at improving 
labor opportunities. Although the approaches to foster transitions from welfare to work 
differ among the different subprograms evaluated, they all bring about substantially higher 




While  results  show  that participation in work-related  activities  is associated to better 
employment outcomes, it is of interest that the three kinds of treatments –general activities, 
direct employment activities and mixed strategies– present different effectiveness levels. 
Among the three different options, intensive labor policies intended for welfare recipients 
stand out as those with the highest capacity to increase employment opportunities. It seems 
that it is even better to assign most of the available resources to direct activities promoting 
employment than to combine these actions with very general job assistance activities. It 
could be the case that placing welfare recipients –especially those hardest to employ– into 
very different daily labor routines could reduce the program’s efficiency.  
 
If attention is focused on more specific indicators of employment success, the evidence is 
somewhat mixed. Our second binary indicator shows the possibility of being employed and 
having a legal contract covered by employer’s contributions. The most relevant result is 
that very general labor activities are not enough to guarantee a stable position in the labor 
market. They produce very modest positive effects as compared to general life-skills 
activities. Furthermore, their results seem very limited compared to those produced by 
training or mixed strategies. The second group of activities appears to be the most suitable 
strategy in this case. 
 
As stated above, employment results can be considered as intermediate outcomes. While 
most of the subprograms analyzed aim to move welfare recipients into work, the final 
objective of these policies is to achieve more direct effects on the households’ economic 
well-being. For this reason, it is important to test whether participation in the different 
subprograms helps to improve the economic situation of these households. Among other 
dimensions,  income  poverty has been at the heart of the mainstream approach to 
identifying economic well-being in welfare reform.    16 
 
Subjective poverty indicators are given in Table 3 for each pair-wise comparison. Several 
points are worth mentioning. Firstly, it is interesting to note that there are substantial 
differences between the treatments under study. As a rule, work-related activities not only 
contribute to higher employment rates, but also seem to reduce income poverty measured 
on a subjective base. However, results are not significant. Secondly, intensive employment 
programs appear to be the most efficient policy, especially if they are not combined with 
more general labor-related activities.  Results for the latter  show that welfare-to-work 
subprograms not resting on specific forms of subsidized employment or social enterprises 
do not produce substantially better results than activities aimed to make it easier for some 




The survey also enables us to carry out intertemporal analysis. More precisely, households 
are asked to report changes in their economic situation over the last decade. We have 
defined a dummy variable representing upward variation in self-assessed income. It might 
be  expected that households moving from welfare to employment would report 
improvements in their economic situation. A virtuous circle of getting employed, higher 
earnings and increasing disposable income could take hold. Furthermore, previous studies 
have found a significant relationship between unemployment and subjective  income 
insecurity in Spain (Ayala et al., 1999).  
 
Somewhat mixed evidence comes from the estimated effects for the different treatments. 
As a rule, the range of variation of the estimated average effects is narrow and are not 
significant. Work-related activities do not seem to have substantial effects on  the 
intertemporal changes of economic well-being among welfare participants. In any case, we 
should be especially cautious about possible outcomes resulting from self-reported income. 
As stated by Ravallion and Lokshin (2002), concerns about measurement errors and the 
influence of latent psychological factors on observed respondent characteristics limit the 
validity of the well-being inferences drawn from answers to subjective survey questions. 
 
A third dimension for the assessment of the different subprograms’ performance is 
material well-being. As discussed above, we have combined indicators of material hardship   17 
to create composite measures of material deprivation and living standards. We assign 
weights according to the proportion of households lacking (or not lacking) the respective 
item. The idea is that the higher the proportion of households with a particular item, the 
greater the extent to which the item may be deemed to be a necessity. Table 4 presents 
results for both indicators. A comparison across treatments shows that participation in 
work-related activities does not sharply alter the households’ levels of material well-being. 
Average effects are rather small in most cases suggesting that participation in work-related 
schemes has not reduced material hardship. A similar result is also found for the measure 
summarizing the number of housing problems. Work-related programs seem to produce 




One possible explanation for the little impact of targeted welfare-to-work programs on 
material well-being is that increasing work participation does not automatically lift out of 
material hardship. Family income may not increase significantly and structural forms of 
deprivation, like housing, remain unresolved. However, this conclusion should be treated 
cautiously. On the one hand, relevant methodological issues affecting evaluation may be 
present. As discussed by Winship and Jencks (2004), welfare leavers who have experienced 
serious problems of material hardship are hard to find  and the representativeness of 
hardship variables in the survey could be limited. Additionally, it must be noted that 
composite or summary measures provide additional information on the concurrence of 
various hardships, but are at risk of obscuring detail in the individual components. On the 
other hand, the effects on material well-being could also be interpreted as a kind of Pareto 
improvement. While work-related sub-programs do not materially harm welfare recipients, 
these activities help to increase their employment levels. 
 
Results also seem to support the idea that participation in work-related activities would lead 
to larger reductions in poverty (self-assessed) than in material hardship. This conclusion is 
in keeping with well-known prior empirical evidence for Spain. Past research has shown 
only a very moderate association between poverty and hardship measures, both considered 
in static and dynamic perspective [Pérez-Mayo (2005)].  
   18 
While the results show that participation in work-related activities is associated to limited 
effects on material well-being, it is important to note again that the three labor treatments 
give rise to different outcomes. Participation in intensive work-related activities turns out 
to be more effective for reducing material hardship than involvement in general labor-
oriented  activities.  The average effects  are  small  anyway  and in most cases are not 
significant. 
 
These findings can be very helpful for a better understanding of the program evaluated. In 
practice, program heterogeneity can cause a variety of results depending on the variable 
chosen as outcome. In this sense, a final matrix of treatments and outcomes can help to 
assess the overall effects of a huge range of options. It can provide useful feedback on 
whether the different-subprograms are generating impacts consistent  with long-term 
expectations. Policy-makers can also choose different input combinations depending on 
political priorities. If the main goal of the program is to improve employment for welfare 
recipients, there is no doubt that some alternatives do indeed work better than others. If 
the priority is to minimize material hardship, the matrix allows us to identify which 




Table 5 shows how the effects of the different subprograms largely depend on the outcome 
variable. Nonetheless, we find some evidence that could help to clarify the available array 
of options to policy-makers. One might expect employment and material well-being to be 
positively correlated, so that engaging welfare participants in work-related activities would 
improve other dimensions of these households’ economic well-being. However, our results 
put into question the traditional view that transitions from welfare to work bring about 
improvements in the different dimensions of economic well-being. This implies that there 
is not a universal solution to the different problems posed by welfare populations. Policy-
makers must frequently make hard decisions subject to very complex restrictions. 
 
In any case, the multiple states/multiple outcomes matrix can be a useful tool for handling 
different options. The corresponding analyses of files and columns can be powerful tools 
for evaluating the various options that often confront programs’ managers in deciding the 
way ahead. If they have  to decide between fostering participation in work-related   19 
subprograms or general activities promoting life skills, the matrix shows that, for the most 
part,  the former activities have a positive effect on employment and poverty without 
harming substantially material well-being. Therefore, if employment indicators are used to 
measure the programs’ success,  participation  in work-related  activities should be 
encouraged. If the main objective of ‘insertion’ activities is improving living standards, the 
options are not so well defined.  
 
Regarding employment activities, there is an additional binary choice. Once the 
determination  to  implement  work-related  activities  becomes the policies’  guideline,  a 
decision must be made on the best way to promote employment and economic well-being. 
The overarching finding from the paper is that intensive employment activities, such as 
subsidized employment or engagement in social enterprises, yield remarkably better results 




Major policy changes have increased interest in outcomes for participants in welfare 
reforms. In most countries, the main goal of the enacted reforms has been to reduce the 
dependence of low-income households on government support by improving employment 
opportunities while continuing to maintain a social safety net for qualified families. This 
paper has assessed the effects of Madrid’s Ingreso Madrileño de Integración (IMI). This program 
is standard among the existing schemes in Southern Europe. Compared to other welfare 
models, the development of heterogeneous subprograms providing  different ‘insertion’ 
services  is the main difference  it presents.  The merging of two different datasets –
administrative records and a survey– together with the use of pair-wise comparisons and a 
huge set of outcome variables allow us to estimate the average effects of the different 
subprograms. 
 
The picture emerging from the different evaluations is generally consistent. For policy-
makers, work-related activities appear attractive at first sight, as they imply a concentration 
of resources to reduce welfare participation and improve employment. The results of this 
paper, however, lead us to caution against drawing oversimplified conclusions. Empirical 
evaluation suggests that the effects of the different ‘insertion’ activities are rather varied 
depending on the outcome variables. By increasing employment levels, work-related   20 
activities seem successful in moving low-income families away from dependence on welfare 
policies. The long-run impact of these changes on economic well-being could be positive. 
Work today should raise experience tomorrow and raise future employability. However, 
higher labor participation does not seem enough to enable low-income families to achieve 
better results in terms of material well-being. If the overriding goal of social policy is to 
reduce material deprivation and social hardship, there is no doubt that work-related policies 
are not entirely suitable. In any case, strict assessments on the validity of these activities 
could be misleading.  
 
Among the different work-related subprogram options, intensive employment activities, 
such as subsidized employment or engagement in social enterprises, yield remarkably better 
results than general work-related schemes. They result in higher levels of employment and 
subjective well-being. In terms of public intervention, however, this finding should be 
taken with caution. Given the high levels of heterogeneity among welfare populations, 
possible inferences should be restricted to certain households. In practice, work-first 
strategies can only be a solution for a segment of the recipients’ population. For those 
unemployable, an upgrading of life skills through specific non-labor related interventions 
should result more efficient.   
 
Our findings provide new evidence to address some of the central questions the current 
welfare reform debate has raised. As other countries are discussing similar reforms, our 
results could contribute to examine  the welfare experiments in Southern Europe  with 
greater interest. New evidence on approaches that consider heterogeneous subprograms 
and different types of outcomes might inform and partially shape the future public policy 
agenda in the welfare reform debate.   21 
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Table 1 
 
Evaluation  Treatment A  Treatment B 
1  Participation in a work-related scheme  Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
2  Participation in general work-related schemes  Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
3  Participation in intensive work-related schemes  Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
4  Participation in mixed work-related schemes  Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
5  Participation in intensive work-related schemes  Participation in a general work-related scheme 
6  Participation in mixed work-related schemes  Participation in a general work-related scheme  
7  Participation in mixed work-related schemes  Participation in an  intensive work-related 
schemes  
   25 
Table 2 
Employment Effects  
(PS matching estimates) 
 
TREATMENT  OUTCOME VARIABLES 
  Employment 
(currently) 
Legal contract 
and payroll taxes 
Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 
Participation in a work-related scheme  
 








Average effect    11.5*  22.5** 
Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 
Participation in general work-related schemes 
 








Average effect    4.9  2.9 
Non-participation in general work-related schemes 
 
Participation in intensive work-related schemes 
 








Average effect    49.4**  38.3** 
Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 
Participation in mixed work-related schemes 
 








Average effect    21.3*  51.8*** 
Participation in general work-related schemes 
 
Participation in intensive work-related schemes 
 








Average effect    60.4**  25.0* 
Participation in general work-related schemes 
 
Participation in mixed work-related schemes 
 








Average effect    18.1  35.4*** 
Participation in intensive work-related schemes 
 
Participation in mixed work-related schemes 
 








Average effect    -21.3  22.0* 
1 Standard deviation in brackets. 
***Significant at 99%, **Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%.   26 
Table 3 
Effects on Poverty and Subjective Well-Being  
(PS matching estimates) 
 
TREATMENT  OUTCOME VARIABLES 







Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 










Average effect  -7.4  5.9 
Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 










Average effect  4.8  13.3 
Non-participation in general work-related schemes 
 












Average effect  -9.6  -5.3 
Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 










Average effect  -20.0**  -0.4 
Participation in general work-related schemes 
 










Average effect  -29.5**  3.6 
Participation in general work-related schemes 
 










Average effect  -19.2**  -14.6 
Participation in intensive work-related schemes 
 










Average effect  -7.7  -0.4 
1 Standard deviation in brackets. 
**Significant at 95%   27 
Table 4 
Effects on Material Hardship  
(PS matching estimates) 
 
TREATMENT  OUTCOME VARIABLES 






Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 














Average effect  -1.1  3.9  9.2* 
Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 














Average effect  0.4  -3.5  8.9* 
Non-participation in general work-related schemes 
 














Average effect  0.3  2.9  -1.1 
Non-participation in a work-related scheme 
 














Average effect  -4.2  18.1  8.2 
Participation in general work-related schemes 
 














Average effect  4.0  -0.2  -9.8 
Participation in general work-related schemes 
 














Average effect  -3.8  23.3  1.3 
Participation in intensive work-related schemes 
 














Average effect  -8.2  18.5  1.4 
1 Standard deviation in brackets. 
*Significant at 90%. 





  Comparison 1  Comparison 2  Comparison 3  Comparison 4  Comparison 5  Comparison 6  Comparison 7 
Employment (currently)  ++*  +  +++**  ++*  +++**  ++  --- 
Legal contract and payroll taxes  +++**  ≈  +++**  +++***  +++*  +++***  ++* 
Subjective poverty  -  ≈  --  --**  ---**  --**  - 
Economic situation compared to 10 years ago  +  +  -  ≈  ≈  --  ≈ 

























(≈): <5%; (-/+): 5-10%; (--/++): 10-20%; (+++/---): >20% 
 
  ***Significant at 99%, **Significant at 95%, *Significant at 90%.   29 
Figure 1. Common Support 
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 Annex. A.1. Selected descriptive statistics 
Evaluation 1 
 
Participants in treatment a  Participants in treatment b 
Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance 
Number of social problems  0.94  0.81  0.98  0.82 
Single parent  0.30  0.21  0.35  0.23 
Educational level1  2.83  1.04  2.94  1.00 
Unemployment rate   15.42  14.21  15.60  13.97 
Household size2  1.92  0.60  1.93  0.53 
Number of children3  0.78  0.78  0.89  0.79 
Single person  0.25  0.19  0.23  0.18 
Female  0.65  0.23  0.68  0.22 
Evaluation 2 
 
Participants in treatment a  Participants in treatment b 
Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance 
Number of social problems  0.94  0.81  1.04  0.82 
Single parent  0.30  0.21  0.37  0.23 
Educational level  2.83  1.04  2.85  1.01 
Unemployment rate   15.42  14.21  15.47  14.24 
Household size  1.92  0.60  1.95  0.51 
Number of children  0.78  0.78  0.93  0.79 
Single person  0.25  0.19  0.21  0.17 
Female  0.65  0.23  0.70  0.21 
Evaluation 3 
 
Participants in treatment a  Participants in treatment b 
Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance 
Number of social problems  0.94  0.81  0.84  0.85 
Single parent  0.30  0.21  0.28  0.20 
Educational level  2.83  1.04  3.04  0.98 
Unemployment rate   15.42  14.21  15.49  13.87 
Household size  1.92  0.60  1.99  0.55 
Number of children  0.78  0.78  0.87  0.79 
Single person  0.25  0.19  0.20  0.16 
Female  0.65  0.23  0.66  0.23 
Evaluation 4 
 
Participants in treatment a  Participants in treatment b 
Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance 
Number of social problems  0.94  0.81  0.94  0.80 
Single parent  0.30  0.21  0.33  0.22 
Educational level  2.83  1.04  3.06  0.95 
Unemployment rate   15.42  14.21  15.87  13.48 
Household size  1.92  0.60  1.87  0.55 
Number of children  0.78  0.78  0.83  0.79 
Single person  0.25  0.19  0.27  0.20 
Female  0.65  0.23  0.64  0.23 
 





Participants in treatment a  Participants in treatment b 
Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance 
Number of social problems  1.04  0.82  0.84  0.85 
Single parent  0.37  0.23  0.28  0.20 
Educational level  2.85  1.01  3.04  0.98 
Unemployment rate   15.47  14.24  15.49  13.87 
Household size  1.95  0.51  1.99  0.55 
Number of children  0.93  0.79  0.87  0.79 
Single person  0.21  0.17  0.20  0.16 
Female  0.70  0.21  0.66  0.23 
Evaluation 6 
 
Participants in treatment a  Participants in treatment b 
Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance 
Number of social problems  1.04  0.82  0.94  0.80 
Single parent  0.37  0.23  0.33  0.22 
Educational level  2.85  1.01  3.06  0.95 
Unemployment rate   15.47  14.24  15.87  13.48 
Household size  1.95  0.51  1.87  0.55 
Number of children  0.93  0.79  0.83  0.79 
Single person  0.21  0.17  0.27  0.20 
Female  0.70  0.21  0.64  0.23 
Evaluation 7 
 
Participants in treatment a  Participants in treatment b 
Mean  Variance  Mean  Variance 
Number of social problems  0.84  0.85  0.94  0.80 
Single parent  0.28  0.20  0.33  0.22 
Educational level  3.04  0.98  3.06  0.95 
Unemployment rate   15.49  13.87  15.87  13.48 
Household size  1.99  0.55  1.87  0.55 
Number of children  0.87  0.79  0.83  0.79 
Single person  0.20  0.16  0.27  0.20 
Female  0.66  0.23  0.64  0.23 
1 five groups, 2 four groups, 3 four groups 
 